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In this research, the author documents the process of
production management employed in a naval shipyard in seek-
ing adherence to schedules during the non-nuclear portion
of the overhaul of nuclear submarines. In addition to re-
cording the process details for those who may learn from
them in the future, the -author also demonstrates some of
the problems confronting managers in all naval shipyards.
The author first profiles the history, mission, and organi-
zation of the activity chosen for the research, Mare Island
Naval Shipyard, then develops the process constraints of
estimated cost, schedule, personnel resources, and autho-
rized work packages for an individual ship. The discussion
then shifts to a detailed description of the management
aids used to monitor and assess overhaul progress and of
the techniques employed, using these aids, to seek schedule
adherence on several ships simultaneously. The research
concludes with a summary of the total process and sugges-
tions for further research.
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The purpose of this research is to document and explain
the management techniques employed by senior management in a
Naval shipyard in striving to achieve schedule adherence dur-
ing nuclear submarine overhauls. Compounding this problem
are explicit constraints in the form of personnel resources
and implicit constraints in the form of cost factors, all of
which dictate that tradeoffs constantly be made. These con-
straints result from an overhaul schedule imposed by higher
authority as shall be seen. The process analyzed was thus
one of production management in an environment of limited
physical resources.
B. SCOPE
The research was intentionally limited in scope to insure
sufficient depth of investigation. Only one overhauling acti-
vity, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, was consulted, and only the
non-nuclear portion of that activity's management process was
specifically addressed. The author fully recognized that the
techniques employed by other shipyards may be different from
those described herein and that even within the shipyard in-
vestigated there are significant process differences between
the non-nuclear and nuclear overhaul management phases. Hav-
ing thus acknowledged that this thesis presents only a portion
12

of the total picture of present day overhaul management tech-
niques, the author nevertheless maintains that the process
description presented is accurate and may be used to gain in-
sight into the typical problems facing the managers of all
shipyards.
C. PERSPECTIVE
As will become apparent, the author found that there were
many perspectives from which to address the research. It
was apparent early in the research, however, that the day-
to-day common denominator for non-nuclear production manage-
ment matters at Mare Island was the Repair Officer. The re-
search thus addresses the process mainly from the Repair
Officer's perspective by describing the inputs and techniques
used by that officer to effect coordinated production manage-
ment among several overhauling ships.
D. RESEARCH TECHNIQUE
Although some background reading was done (to be dis-
cussed later) the research effort consisted largely of per-
sonal interviews by the author with key shipyard officials
over a period of 11 weeks. The author obtained complete co-
operation in the research from all officials contacted. In
an effort to insure that the facts derived from these inter-
views were stated correctly, the Repair Officer and the
Shipyard Commander were afforded an opportunity to provide
comments on the accuracy of the research.
13

E. FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS
Chapter II describes the overall organization of Mare
Island Naval Shipyard and presents that activity's strategic
profile. Chapter III provides further background by describ-
ing a typical sequence of events in the overhaul of a nuclear
submarine at Mare Island. Chapter IV discusses the detailed
development of the constraints within which the Repair Offi-
cer must work schedule, estimated cost, personnel re-
sources, and work package and describes the interrelation-
ships among these constraints. Chapter V discusses the
details of the management tools used by the Repair Officer
in his role as production coordinator and "whip". Chapter VI
discusses his use of these tools to manage the production
effort for all overhauling ships simultaneously and describes
the tradeoff problems involved. Chapter VII provides a
summary of the overall process and Chapter VIII suggests
topics for further research.
14

II. DESCRIPTION, ORGANIZATION, AND STRATEGIC
PROFILE OF MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD
A. MARE ISLAND AS A MEMBER OF THE NAVAL SHIPYARD COMPLEX
Mare Island Naval Shipyard is one of eight members of
the Naval Shipyard Complex, the other member yards being lo-
cated in Portsmouth, N. H. ,' Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston,
Bremerton, Washington (Puget Sound), Long Beach, and Pearl
Harbor. The official mission of this complex is:
"To provide logistic support for assigned ships
and service craft; to perform authorized work in con-
nection with construction, conversion, overhaul, re-
pair, alteration, drydocking, and outfitting of ships
and craft, as assigned; to perform manufacturing, re-
search, and test work, as assigned; and to provide
services and material to other activities and units
,
as directed by competent authority." [1]
Although each naval shipyard can perform a variety of ser-
vices in consonance with this mission, Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command (hereafter, NAVSEA) has designated special
uses for each of these yards. For Mare Island Naval Ship-
yard, the specialty mission involves the construction, con-
version and overhaul of all types of submarines and the over-
haul of surface ships, including nuclear, except aircraft
carriers [1] . Since reference 1 was published, the ship
construction mission was deleted for all naval shipyards
but portions of this capability still remain at Mare Island.
Reactivation of Mare Island's submarine construction
capability would require considerable retooling and the
15

acquisition and training of specialized trades to obtain the
balance of skills that are different from the present needs
during overhauls . To adequately re-establish a construction
capability from the personnel standpoint would require at
least two years.
B. LOCATION
Mare Island Naval Shipyard is located in Vallejo, Calif-
ornia at the northeastern corner of San Pablo Bay at the
mouth of the Napa River. From an initial land purchase by
the Navy of only 956 acres in 1853, Mare Island has grown
through land reclamation and grants to a present size of over
2600 acres of hard land and almost 1900 acres of tidelands
[2] .
C. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF WORK FORCE
Although the size and composition by trade of the work-
force in naval shipyards varies with the requirements of the
work (see Chapter IV for further details), Mare Island, with
a total shipyard employment of over 9 800 of which approxi-
mately 64-70 work in the production area, ranks third in terms
of work force behind Puget Sound 'and Norfolk Naval Shipyards
[3,4]. Of this total production department workforce, ap-
proximately 1750 are available as indirect labor and 3960 as
direct labor on any given day (the remaining 76 workers are
projected daily absentees) [3] The direct labor force in-
cludes all non-salaried workers less supervisors whose time
is charged against specific authorized work items on ships
undergoing repairs. Indirect labor thus includes salaried
16

and supervisory personnel whose work is not directly trace-
able to specific authorized work items. In addition to this
civilian complement. Mare Island is assigned about 5 mili-
tary officers and senior petty officers in varying capacities
from Shipyard Commander to ship superintendent.
A serious workforce problem confronting Mare Island man-
agement is an average shortage, projected through 1976 based
upon existing schedules, of over 650 direct labor mandays per
day when the available direct labor is compared with the esti-
mated direct labor requirements [3] . The impact of this
shortage is to require more overtime and subcontracting that
might otherwise be necessary. This shortage, together with
overtime use restrictions, reduces management's flexibility
in using overtime on important work. This point will be dis-
cussed more fully in Chapter VI.
Another workforce problem for Mare Island is the decline
in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in recent years
(from a high of 6.5:1 in May 19 7 3 to 2.2:1 by December 1975).
This decline was caused by a Reduction in Force (RIF) of about
4000 workers in 1973 coupled with the retirement of many
skilled World War II workers and the subsequent need, as work-
load increased, to fill many of these previously skilled posi-
tions with unskilled labor. Contributing to this problem was
a changing workforce profile as the shipyard new construction
mission was deleted. The impact of this reduced skill level
factor on the direct labor mandays required to complete the
overhaul of one recent submarine as opposed to another of the
17

same class completed previously when this factor was not as
prevalent was estimated to be over 18,000 mandays . This was
over 2 5 percent of the total manday increase experienced in
the more recent ship.
D. ORGANIZATION
Because the orientation of this research was on non-
nuclear production management, only those portions of the
shipyard organization pertaining to that subject will be
discussed.
Figure 1 shows the organization of the Production Depart-
ment at Mare Island as it pertains to non-nuclear production
management. The Production Officer (Code 30 0) has direct
access to the Shipyard Commander for matters pertaining to
production. The majority of the day-to-day decisions in the
Production Department regarding production emphasis and re-
source use, however, "are made by the Repair Officer (Code
330) consistent with Shipyard Commander and Production Offi-
cer guidance on project priorities. Reporting directly to
the Repair Officer are the Assistant Repair Officers (where
assigned) and, by convention, the ship superintendents for
each vessel. (Mare Island does not use the Project Officer
organizational concept wherein a Project Officer is assigned
to each overhauling vessel.) The ship superintendents func-
tion as the Repair Officer's representatives for each vessel
in overhaul, serving to plan, coordinate, and expedite the
accomplishment of scheduled repairs. Also reporting to the











































Production Department Organization Chart (Partial
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Branch (Code 3 65), the Production Control Branch (Code 375),
and the Docking Officer (Code 340). Within the Production
Control Branch, three sections (Work Status, Scheduling, and
Progress) maintain daily control over the administration of
the various documents used for those functions (to be dis-
cussed more fully in Chapters IV and V).
As figure 1 indicates, the group superintendents for each
of the major trade areas (structural, mechanical, electrical/
electronics, and service) also report directly to the Produc-
tion Officer. Within these major trade groupings are the in-
dividual shops (pipe, inside machine, riggers, etc.), each
with a shop head who reports to the group superintendent.
E. IMMEDIATE SENIOR
The Shipyard Commander reports to NAVSEA (07) (Industrial
and Eacilities Management Directorate) on matters pertaining
to the operation of Mare Island Naval Shipyard.
F. CUSTOMER
With its traditional submarine orientation, Mare Island's
"customer" is normally Commander Submarine Force, Pacific
(COMSUBPAC). Submarines overhauling in Mare Island are ad-
ministratively assigned to COMSUBPAC for the duration of
their overhaul, even if they will return to the Atlantic
Fleet upon its completion. As the customer, COMSUBPAC func-
tions as Type Commander to insure that the overhaul funds
available to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
(who pays for the overhaul) are properly spent [5] . For
20

surface ship overhauls for ships under his control, Commander
Surface Force, Pacific (COMSURFPAC) assumes the customer
function.
G. SHIP LOADING AND WORK ASSIGNMENT
As a naval shipyard, Mare Island does not "bid" for over-
haul contracts in the same way that a private shipyard does.
In fact, Mare Island workload is not- a matter of choice for
the shipyard but rather, is assigned by NAVSEA and the Chief
of Naval Operations through the aid of a computerized Long
Range Planning System (LRPS) which uses as inputs the exist-
ing CNO three year construction, conversion, and overhaul
schedules and the known scope of work required on a given
ship. By comparing these inputs against yard capabilities
(in terms of manpower and docking space), yard specialties
(submarines for Mare Island), existing homeport policies,
shipwork priorities
,
.and the desired split between naval and
private shipyards, the LRPS produces as an output a 10-year
distribution of workload by public and naval shipyard [6].
The LRPS output is subjected to the review of both NAVSEA and
CNO prior to approval and is issued in the form of an OPNAV
Notice (4710 series) which assigns ship overhauls to speci-
fic shipyards for specific periods for the next 2 4 months.
Mare Island has a formal input to the workload assignment
process in the form of a monthly Planned Workload and Employ-
ment Report (NAVSHIPS Form 12280/4) which shows actual and
projected workloads for the current month and the next nine
months. In addition, informal means (telephone, etc.) may
21

be used before the fact to convey the desirability or unde-
sirability of a particular ship assignment to the ultimate
decision-makers
.
The approved LRPS output as discussed above has resulted
in an approximate average submarine overhaul shipload at
Mare Island as follows:
Rounded Average
(nuclear (SSN/SSBN) and non-






In interpreting this loading data, the reader should recognize
that, in addition to vessels in overhaul, Mare Island also
simultaneously conducts assigned restricted availabilities
on submarines, normally of about 8 weeks duration, and start-
ing in 1978 (projected), will be assigned at least one surface
ship overhaul. Further, because the nuclear submarines in-
volved are typically older (SSN 585 or 594 Class, SSBN 598
or 608 Class) the productive workload on these ships is
greater than would be necessary on a new ship.
Although the projected LRPS ship assignments are avail-
able for use by the shipyard considerably in advance, e.g.,
As used here, restricted availability refers to a period
of time during which a ship is made available to the shipyard
for the accomplishment of specific items of work. During this
time period, the ship is rendered incapable of performing its





1977 and 1978 projections above, Mare Island does not use
these shipload projections as personnel procurement/release
authority since they are subject, to change. Augmentation
or reductions in the labor force are made only upon issuance
of an OPNAV NOTE 4710 confirming the ship assignments and
in compliance with existing labor contracts.
H. THE PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT GOAL
Mare Island defines its goal insofar as production
management and schedule adherence are concerned in the
following manner [7]:
" they (shipyard managers) shall manage their man-
power to accomplish scheduled work on time and at mini-
mum cost."
2
The purpose of this research, as stated earlier, is to
explain how Mare Island approaches this problem in day-to-
day management.
2 Implicit m this statement is the understanding that
coincident with efforts to achieve schedule adherence there




III. A TYPICAL OVERHAUL SEQUENCE
A. PURPOSE
This chapter provides the reader with additional back-
ground by presenting a typical overhaul sequence and defin-
ing the Key Event concept.
B. KEY EVENTS
Key events play an extremely important role in the manage-
ment of overhauls by providing management with discrete, well-
defined checkpoints at which the status of work may be
determined and evaluated. Key events are simply points in
the overall sequence of work on a system or systems which
the shipyard or higher authority has determined are important
milestones relative to the progressing of work completion.
All authorized shipyard work is issued by a job order written
by a planner. In addition to providing a means of charging
the customer via the job order number, this document describes
in detail the work to be done and relates the separate work
elements to key events. Prior to ea*ch key event, an adminis-
trative review may be conducted to determine that all required
work is completed (Chapter V discusses this aspect of control
in detail)
.
Although Mare Island has defined over 800 such events for
purposes of work status determination, the author has selected
nine of these which represent major status changes in the
ship or ship systems for purposes of describing the overhaul
24

sequence. These same key events typically define the "criti-
cal path" (or longest path to completion) as well. They are
ship arrival, drydocking, primary (reactor) plant fill, un-
docking, engine room steaming, reactor plant hot operations,
reactor plant criticality, sea trials, and ship completion.
Figure 2 depicts a recent SSBN overhaul initial schedule
in terms of these key events. The number associated with
each event is the days after ship arrival at which the event
is expected to start. While this 12 1/2 month schedule sup-
ports an SSBN overhaul of 15 month allowed duration (the
reason for this apparent discrepancy will be discussed in
Chapter IV), different ships with different allowed overhaul
lengths would still follow the same approximate sequencing.
Only the length of the sequence would change in those cases.
C. DESCRIPTION OF OVERHAUL PHASES
The portion of the overhaul from ship arrival and dry-
docking until primary plant fill is the period of peak pro-
jected overhaul manning. During this time period, hull ac-
cess cuts are made, all major ripout and unshipping is com-
pleted, the hull and ballast tank areas are repaired and
preserved, and work on those reactor plant and non-reactor
plant systems necessary to support the reactor plant fill
evolution is completed to the necessary degree. During this
period ractor plant refueling is conducted and most of the
work necessary to support undocking is completed. For this
and other major key events, the shipyard prepares prerequi-
































authority [8,9] and any other special requirements which may
exist because of conditions at the time. Final review and
signing of these prerequisite lists by the shipyard and ship's
force constitutes concurrence that the required system status
as defined by the prerequisite list is achieved and that the
key event may proceed. Chapter V further addresses the use
of prerequisite lists.
Between the filling of the reactor plant and undocking,
the remainder of the work necessary for safe waterborne
operation is completed. This includes, where not already
completed, reinstallation of major components too large to
fit through hatches, closure of major hull access cuts, and
restoration of double barrier protection between open internal
portions of sea-connected systems and the sea. Incorporated
in the preparation for the undocking event are also provisions
for emergency dewatering of compartment bilges, ballast tank
blow, and interior communications for damage control purposes.
From undocking to engine room steaming, considerable test-
ing begins in electronics and fire control components rein-
stalled prior to undocking. In the propulsion area, emphasis
is placed upon preparing the steam, condensate and associated
cooling systems for the shore steaming evolution. Typically,
the systems required for this event (or portions thereof)
are flushed, restored, and subjected to a strength and tight-
ness test to verify integrity. Operational tests are also
conducted following tightness testing. During this period,
27

cold (less than 200°F) operations of this type in the reactor
plant area are also conducted. Once the prerequisite list for
engine room steaming is completed, shore steam is used to test
the steam-driven engine room components.
From the start of engine room steaming until reactor plant
hot operations commence, emphasis shifts again to providing
the necessary non-nuclear system status to support the latter
event. In practice, most of this work is already completed
and the two events can usually proceed almost without inter-
ruption except for the necessary flushing which must follow
the use of shore steam. In fact, the shipyard generally
schedules these two events to occur at the same time so that
the option exists to proceed with whichever is most ready.
Once again, after engine room steaming completes, a prerequi-
site list is signed and reactor plant hot operations (at or
near normal temperature) commences.
Reactor plant criticality, the next major key event, is
very demanding in terms of requirements placed upon non-
nuclear systems. This event is preceded by a thorough in-
spection of the entire engineering spaces by representatives
of the shipyard, ship's force, NAVSEA (08), and the reactor
plant contractor to determine readiness for this event. Ex-
cept for minor touchup painting, stowage-for-sea , removal
of special test instrumentation, and other non-operational
deficiencies, Mare Island seeks to have the engineering
spaces essentially ready for sea at the time of reactor plant
criticality. In fact, the ship's force signature on the
28

prerequisite list for criticality normally constitutes final
acceptance of the systems involved except for emergent
deficiencies during trials.
Following criticality, emphasis traditionally shifts to
completing non-engineering work in the weapons, navigation,
communications, and tactical sensor areas. During this per-
iod, special sea trials instrumentation is installed, final
housekeeping items are completed, the ship is loaded for
sea, and all work is completed. Following dock trials, a
dockside "fast" cruise by the ship's crew, and, with permis-
sion of higher authority, sea trials are conducted.
Between sea trials and ship completion, sea trials de-
ficiencies are corrected to the extent permitted by the
schedule. Typically, all major items are completed, even
if a schedule slippage is necessary.
D. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The overhaul sequence described is typical of that used
by Mare Island and other shipyards for submarine overhaul
scheduling purposes. Minor variations in the sequencing of
events do occur, however. As an example, on recent ships at
Mare Island, reactor plant fill has been intentionally de-
layed until after undocking. Similarly, the durations be-
tween the major key events discussed are subject to varia-
tion not only by ship type but according to current manage-
ment philosophy. The latter consideration will be more fully
developed in Chapters IV and VI.
29

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTRAINTS
A. PURPOSE
This chapter will present a detailed development of the
environmental constraints under which production management
at Mare Island is practiced. In order to realize the im-
portance of these constraints, however, the reader should
recall the production management goal stated in Chap-
ter II. Implicit in that goal were the four variables which
must constantly be reckoned with in the production management
process: available manpower, authorized work, the schedule
and estimated cost. Each of these variables or constraints
are controllable to some degree in the short term and they
are all interrelated. This chapter describes how the variables
are developed and describes the interrelationships. Chapter
VI will take the available manpower, schedule, authorized
workload and cost estimate as given and further discuss the
tradeoffs inherent as schedule adherence is sought simul-
taneously on several different vessels in a cost-conscious
environment. As an aside, the author assumed for purposes of
this research that a fifth constraint, physical plant and
equipment, remained static. In the day-to-day management
perspective of this study, this assumption certainly is valid.
In a longer term context, the reader should be aware that
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factors are also considered for nuclear attack submarines
CSSN). These factors often serve to give SSN type ships
implicit priority in the overhaul environment with the re-
sult that, as can be seen from the data displayed above,
these ships are generally scheduled for overhauls of the
shortest possible duration consistent with the work to be
done. For shipyard management, the decision of resource
allocation priorities favors the SSBN type ship in compli-
ance with reference 10.
Another consideration which bears heavily upon the
determination of scheduled overhaul duration is whether or
not reactor refueling is required. Refueling is an extreme-
ly time consuming and costly evolution which typically adds
about 2 months to the overhaul duration. In addition, the
size of the authorized work package during a refueling over-
haul is typically much larger because of this available addi-
tional time. All of the nuclear submarine overhauls re-
cently performed by Mare Island were of this type and all
scheduled through FY77 are of this type.
A third factor considered in overhaul length deter-
mination is the size and composition of the remainder of the
work package including some allowance for growth (emergent
work not identified at the start of the overhaul period).
In the case of the older ships which Mare Island is assigned,
the work packages and the growth factor tend to be larger
than on a newer, perhaps more maintainable, ship. These
factors serve to increase the authorized overhaul duration.
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Finally, the performance of shipyards in the past
for similar types of ships and work packages is considered.
This factor's influence is difficult to assess explicitly
except to state that the durations authorized reflect what
CNO/NAVSEA consider to be an achieveable goal in a well-
managed shipyard in the absence of capacity overloading [10].
2 . Determination of Key Event Dates
Within 3 days of the initial overhaul assignment
(and typically about 1 year prior to ship arrival) an initial
PERT network reflecting the overall sequencing of the over-
haul is drafted by the Production Department Scheduling Sec-
tion (Code 377) (see figure 1) for submission to NAVSEA and
Strategic Systems Project Office Code 26 (SP26) (the latter
for SSBN's only). This initial network is based upon infor-
mation contained in the particular ship's Overhaul Work
Package (OWP), a document prepared under the direction of
NAVSEA which lists, by ship system, all the overhaul work
identified at that early point in time including planned
alterations (shipalts and ordalts). The work contained in
the initial OWP is subject to change as will be discussed
below in developing the authorized work package. Neverthe-
less, particularly in the non-nuclear area, there are basic
activities which will be conducted on each system during
overhaul (ripout of interference components, and repair of
critical valves, hull access cuts, etc.) which lend credi-
bility to this early PERT network. Furthermore, the
shipyard has enough experience in performing these basic
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evolutions on a variety of ship types including similar
ships to be able to assign key event dates to this prelimi-
nary network. These dates are furnished by Code 37 7 and
approved by the Repair Officer and reflect three basic con-
siderations.
The first, discussed above, is an evaluation of how
Mare Island has performed in meeting a particular key event
in the past. This analysis is a difficult one which must
consider aberrations in past overhauls tending to cloud the
"typical" performance as well as an analysis of how projected
conditions at the time of the future overhaul are likely to
be different. The Repair Officer has available graphic data
for past ships indicating the scheduled and actual key event
achievement dates for use in this analysis.
The second consideration which the current Repair
Officer uses in approving the key event dates is one already
reflected in the past key event schedules but subject to
continual updating. This is his personal philosophy of schedul-
ing each key event at the earliest possible time. This
philosophy, which results in an internal schedule typically
two months shorter than the authorized overhaul duration, is
based on an acknowledgement that in managing a process as
complex as a nuclear submarine overhaul involving thousands
of sequentially related operations, a certain percentage,
perhaps 15 to 20 percent, of these will, through either per-
sonnel shortcomings, material delays, growth, or many other
reasons fail to occur on schedule. By scheduling each event
at the earliest possible time, the Repair Officer seeks to
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force problems to the surface early in order to allow more
choice in the execution of available options. As an example,
in PERT terminology, if an activity (some production evolu-
tion from Event A to Event B) has a slack of 1 week (total
duration between Event A and B is three weeks due to other
activities starting or ending at those points whereas the
activity of concern takes only 2 weeks) scheduling the start
of this activity two weeks prior to the occurrence of Event
B allows no time for recovery in the event of unplanned
slippage. On the other hand, scheduling the event to start
as soon as Event A occurs allows the full one week slack for
exercising alternate courses of action should something go
wrong. Such an alternative might be the connection of a
temporary system to replace the system of concern, a reallo-
cation of manpower, or others. An additional benefit derived
from this "schedule early" practice is the forced early pro-
curement and staging (inspection, assembly , and inventory on
or near the job site) of necessary production materials since
the material procurement and staging timetable is related to
key event date. This "schedule early" philosophy is an ex-
tremely important aspect of the entire production management
process at Mare Island and will be discussed further in
Chapter VI.
Once the Repair Officer has approved the Scheduling
Section's key event dates, the preliminary PERT networks are
prepared. The activity durations on these networks, by vir-
tue of the way the key event dates were derived, reflect
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primarily past experience and thus assume normal levels of
manning. They also reflect the normal shift requirements,
specifically excluding overtime and holiday time.
Next, the Scheduling Section (Code 377) prepares
more detailed system-by-system networks reflecting the
approved key events as discussed above for use at the job
scoping conferences at which the results of the Planning
Department's job estimates are integrated with Production
Shop inputs to develop initial cost and time estimates.
These "will-cost" advanced planning manday estimates will
be discussed more fully below under the development of the
cost and manpower constraints. The system-by-system net-
works prepared at this time are normally not subject to
further updating.
As the alteration package is approved, as the ship's
Commanding Officer's work list is approved, and as the re-
sults of pre-arrival ship checks and pre-overhaul tests
(see Ref. 8) are processed, the scope of known work will
change. At ship's arrival minus 12 days (A-12 0) an updated
list of major overhaul milestones and associated dates is
submitted to NAVSEA reflecting these changes and the philos-
ophy discussed above. This listing is updated every 30 days
in compliance with the overhaul contract thereafter and repre-
sents the major vehicle by which changing key events are
promulgated. The final major change to this listing occurs
shortly after the Pre-Arrival Conference (A-9 days) at which
the shipyard presents cost and manday estimates to the Type
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Commander. Based on these estimates, further work may be
added or work may be deleted which may impact slightly the
key event schedule. Normally, however, except for unusual
growth or major emergent work late in the overhaul, the key
events established after the Pre-Arrival Conference are
those to which the shipyard production process is keyed.
The impact of growth and late emergent work will be dis-
cussed in the next section on work package determination.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORK PACKAGE
Although, given the overhaul duration, the shipyard has
considerable control over the determination of key event
dates, this degree of shipyard control does not exist in the
formulation of the work package, which is done entirely by
external agencies albeit with the input of the shipyard.
There are three primary sources of external input to the
authorized work package for a given ship. These are altera-
tions (shipalts, ordalts) and alteration and improvement
(ASI) items, general and specific ship system overhaul re-
quirements, and the ship's work list submitted by the Com-
manding Officer. Each is discussed below.
Shipalts are classified into one of four different types:
Title "A" - Alterations required for certain ships under-
going construction or conversion. They are authorized by
NAVSEA and funded using SCN funds as an investment. Upon
expiration of SCN funds, Title "A" shipalts may be classified
as Title "K" (see below).
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Title "D" - Alterations equivalent-to-a-repair
. They
are authorized by Type Commanders and funded under OSMN funds
as an operating expense.
Title "F" - Alterations capable of accomplishment by
Forces Afloat without special program material. Funded by
the Type Commander OSMN funds.
Title "K" - All other alterations approved and funded by
NAVSEA using OPN funds.
The preliminary (planning version) of a submarine's OWP
is issued by the Submarine Planning and Engineering for
Repairs and Alterations Program Officer (PERA (SS)) about 18
months prior to the ship's arrival. The alteration portion
of this publication consists of a breakdown into nuclear and
non-nuclear sections and a further breakdown by Title "K"
and Title "D" and "F" alterations. The source of this pre-
liminary information is, for Title "K" alterations, the
NAVSEA Advanced Planning letter (issued about A-24 mos) which
lists those Title "K" shipalts and ordalts for which funding
is tentatively planned by NAVSEA during the forthcoming over-
haul subject to availability of material. Guidance on Title
"D" and "F" alterations to be included in the preliminary
OWP is provided to PERA (SS) by the Type Commander.
This preliminary OWP listed is further refined by NAVSEA
with the issuance of the "180 day letter" at A-6 months.
This letter modifies the information contained in the Advanced
Planning letter and constitutes authority for the shipyard to
proceed with planning for the Title "K" shipalts and ordalts

listed, including material procurement. Similarly, for the
Title "D" and "F" shipalts , the Type Commander provides PERA
(SS) an updated version of the preliminary OWP listing fol-
lowing a review of that listing by ship's force to confirm
alteration status and a review of material and funding avail-
ability by the Type Commander. This updating normally occurs
at the pre-arrival conference at about A-9 days. This up-
dated OWP listing is used by the shipyard as authority to
plan and order material for the listed Title "D" and "F"
alterations.
The methodology for inclusion of Type Commander Altera-
tion and Improvement (ASI) items into the preliminary and
subsequent versions of the ship's OWP is identical to that
for Title "D" and "F" shipalts. ASI items differ from ship-
alts primarily in their definition: they constitute minor
Type Commander issued and funded (OSMN) inspections, modi-
fications, or repairs which do not qualify as alterations in
accordance with the definition of Reference 10.
Ordalts , NAVSEA-funded alterations to the equipment com-
prising the submarine fire control and weapons suit, are
authorized with the Title "K" shipalts in the 180 day letter
discussed above.
The general and specific ship system overhaul requirements
are included in the preliminary OWP by PERA(SS) and are de-
rived from the requirements of the General Overhal Specifi-
cations (GOS) for the ship class involved and in addition may
incorporate special Type Commander requirements. These
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requirements include statements like "sandblast and repre-
serve surfaces of the hull and external tanks" and form the
basis for a large percentage of the total non-nuclear work
package on a given ship.
Repairs not specifically covered within the defined scope-
of the OWP ship system requirements discussed above but
desired by the ship's Commanding Officer may be included in
the OWP by two methods. Prior to publishing of the preliminary
OWP issue, repairs deferred for depot level accomplishment
under the Maintenance and Material Management System Mainten-
ance Data Collection Sub-system (3M/MDCS) are automatically
incorporated into the OWP by PERA(SS). After this one-time
update by PERA(SS), all further repairs desired by the Com-
manding Officer must be submitted to the Type Commander for
approval. Typically, a "First Supplemental Work List" is
submitted by the Commanding Officer in this fashion at about
A-9 months. This work package and subsequent supplements,
after approval by the Type Commander, become authority for
the shipyard to commence detailed planning and material pro-
curement on the included repair items.
The shipyard formal input to the process described above
is generally limited to communications with the Type Com-
mander, normally at or before the pre-arrival conference, as
to work recommended by the shipyard (based on pre-overhaul
shipchecks, tests, etc.) but not currently authorized by the
scope of the OWP. The shipyard is not permitted to solicit
work but shares a joint responsibility with the ship Command-
ing Officer for bringing conditions requiring correction to
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the attention of the customer. Because of the shipyard's
considerable experience in submarine repairs , this input
can be extremely valuable.
The scope of the work authorized by the OWP is finalized
at or shortly after the pre-arrival conference with the sub-
mission and acceptance of the shipyard's initial cost and
manday estimates (see section on Costing). Acceptance of
these estimates by NAVSEA (Title "K" shipalts/ordalts ) or
the Type Commander (all other work) or further adjustment of
the authorized scope of work to obtain an estimate within
the limits of available funds "fixes" the final approved work
package which is normally subject to change only due to
emergent work submitted as an additional supplemental work
list.
D. DEVELOPING THE PERSONNEL RESOURCE CONSTRAINT
Personnel resource level changes are made in response to
forecasted workload changes. These forecasts are in turn
based upon two different types of work package estimates.
The first type, the Long-range (advanced planning) manday
estimate, is prepared prior to determination of the precise
work requirements. It may be based upon the requirements of
the preliminary issue of OWP, NAVSEA estimates, cost returns
from previous overhauls, adjustments to numbers of authorized
shipalts, refueling requirements and other factors [7], This
estimate is developed by the Planning Officer and concurred
in by the Production Officer. This early estimate, now the
Shipyard estimate, serves as the basis for all long-range
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workload projections. Forecasted manpower augmentation or
reduction requirements by shop are then statistically de-
veloped by the Work Status Section (Code 37 6) of the Produc-
tion Control Branch. These forecasts, although still tenta-
tive, provide management with early warning of major person-
nel gaps or excesses and permit orderly planning of correc-
tive action. Because of lead times involved in changing
the labor force, this manday figure is used as a basis to
commence workforce adjustments. The actual lead times vary
from trade to trade and in fact tend to "smooth" out what
might otherwise appear to be discrete adjustments in the
labor base.
Short range manday estimates ("should cost") are developed
by the Job Planning Branch (Code 230) of the Planning Depart-
ment as detailed work requirements become known. For
example, after the 18 day letter, short range estimates of
shipalts and ordalts can be prepared. The estimating pro-
cedure, which will be discussed in more detail under Costing
,
considers historical data, available drawings, engineered
standards, pre-overhaul test and inspection reports, results
of shipchecks , shipalt scope sheets and data in ship's work
requests. The result is a planner's issued manday estimate,
by shop
,
of what the given work item should cost. This
figure is adjusted by the Planning Department Submarine Type
Desks (Code 211/214) by increasing it by a reserve factor
(greater than 1.0). to account for historical growth within
the OWP authorized scope of work for the system under
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consideration. The Work Status Section (Code 376) and Ad-
vance Planning Section (Code 227) then apply a shop or in-
direct shop/code (respectively) performance factor to the
estimate. These factors (greater than 1.0) reflect the
effect of prior shop/code or indirect labor performance in
completing work at the planner's issued manday figure.
The result of the above short-range estimating process
is a final projected "will-cost" estimate by shop for the
given work item. From the sum of the short-range forecasts
by shop over all authorized work items (after the pre-
arrival conference adjustments are made) a total ship final
projected manday cost can be determined. This manday figure
is an input to the cost estimating procedure below and can
also be used to manage the manday costs and ship manning dur-
ing the overhaul as will be discussed in Chapters V and VI.
E. COSTING-DEVELOPING THE SALES ESTIMATE
Although the cost estimating procedure is a direct exten-
sion of the labor forecasting procedure described above, the
reader may benefit more from a description of the costing pro-
cess if a brief review of the shipyard's overall financial
environment is presented first.
Mare Island, as are all Naval Shipyards, is a Navy Indus-
trial Fund (NIF) activity. The Navy Industrial Fund, in
turn, provides a revolving type of working capital account
for each associated activity. For example, funds expended
for labor and materials during an overhaul are withdrawn from
this fund at the time they are expended, and replenished by
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periodic customer billings. NIF activities endeavor to op-
erate with neither profit nor loss during a budget period
(fiscal year) and are restricted in the amount of retained
earnings they can carry from one fiscal year to the next.
This limit is currently 0.5 percent of the total annual dol-
lar value of the shipyard's business. This limitation and
operating philosophy both serve to place great pressure
upon the cost estimating process for accurate predictions
and, given a cost estimate, upon cost controls to stay within
the estimate so as to insure neither profit nor loss. In-
terestingly, however, this system removes the incentive to
minimize costs normally present in a profit-oriented account-
ing system. The emphasis in NIF accounting is thus more on
accurate prediction of actual performance than it is on
optimizing actual performance. Pressures for cost minimiza-
tion come primarily from the customer and comparison of costs
incurred with other shipyards. Given this background, the
cost estimating procedures and philosophies will be discussed,
There are two significant points in time at which sales
estimates are particularly important. The first is at the
pre-arrival conference where the shipyard presents the Type
Commander or NAVSEA (depending on the work item) with the
total initial sales estimate (to be discussed below) for all
work items under consideration plus the projected Ultimate
End Cost. These figures enable the Type Commander or NAVSEA
to adjust the size of the work package in response to esti-
mates lower or higher than expected. Once these work package
additions or deletions are made, the final initial sales
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estimate dollar and manday figure resulting becomes the basis
to which incremental cost increases as new work is authorized
are added to keep tally on the total estimated dollar costs
as of any point in time. This procedure continues until the
50 percent completion point in the overhaul, at which time
the shipyard submits to the Type Commander (and NAVSEA) the
fixed price offer. The fixed price offer is the shipyard's
estimate in dollars and mandays of what will be required to
complete the work authorized at that time. This estimate re-
presents a commitment on the part of the shipyard to complete
the work package at that price and, if accepted by the Type
Commander (or NAVSEA) , becomes binding on the shipyard. Al-
though the schedule duration is not an explicit part of the
commitment, the fixed price quoted assumes the schedule will
be met. Furthermore, any new work emerging after fixed pric-
ing becomes the subject of Type Desk negotiation with the
Type Commander as to cost and schedule impact. The shipyard
will normally undertake funded new work after fixed pricing
with an advisory statement to the Type Commander that the
existing schedule could be impacted by the work item.
Any variation between the agreed-upon fixed price and the
final actual (return) costs for a particular work package seg-
ment is called a "variance" and either adds to (fixed price
exceeded cost) or subtracts from (fixed price less than cost)
the shipyard's retained earnings account. These fixed price
variances are posted to the retained earnings account at the
end of each fiscal year. Thus, an ill-considered fixed price
or poor performance in completing the availability could
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adversely affect retained earnings by a large amount. In turn,
large variances in fixed price during a given overhaul may re-
quire that the overhead rate applied to subsequent hulls in
subsequent years be modified to restore the basic "zero bal-
ance" in retained earnings.
The Type Commander either accepts the fixed price proposed
by the shipyard or else rejects it and directs that the over-
haul be priced based upon mandays and material actually ex-
pended. This is known as funding the overhaul on a "cost-re-
imbursable" basis. NAVSEA [in Ref. 11] discusses the expected
shipyard and customer advantages of fixed pricing and states
as policy the requirement for shipyards to enter into fixed
price agreements with customers to the maximum extent practic-
able for overhaul work. The shipyard's task in determining
the fixed price offer is thus to attempt to fairly price the
total known work package, accounting for the fact that fixed
price variances can be used to "adjust" retained earnings
significantly different from the desired zero balance. Thus,
the shipyard, if it has abnormally high retained earnings,
may intentionally submit a low offer expecting to lose money
on it to adjust the retained earnings balance. The customer,
on the other hand, may have to reject an otherwise fair fixed
price offer if it exceeds his overhaul funds available for
the current fiscal year. This is because accepting the fixed
price obligates the customer to identify to the shipyard the
source of fixed price funds within 3 days whereas cost-reim-
bursable funding is normally done on a periodic small deposit
basis at the Naval Regional Finance Center, San Diego. Thus,
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the entire final billing amount is not required in the latter
case until the very end of the overhaul.
The actual mechanics of generating the initial sales esti-
mate for a work item parallel exactly the short-range shop man-
day forecasting estimate discussed previously and uses that
estimate multiplied by a stabilized manday rate to determine
the labor and overhead estimate for that shop and work item
(Mare Island allocates overhead by direct labor hours expended.)
Summing these estimates over all shops gives the total labor
and overhead estimate for the work item.
Commencing in Fiscal Year 1977 a material cost factor
will also be included in the stabilized manday rate mentioned
above. In the interim, material prices are accounted for by
multiplying the job planner's best material cost estimate by
a material escalation factor which accounts for predicted
material price increases and expenditure variations. This
figure is then added to the dollar figure for labor and over-
head. By summing this combined labor, overhead, and material
estimate over all work items, the final initial sales estimate
for use at the pre-arrival conference is determined.
The stabilized manday rate used to estimate the initial
work item costs remains fixed throughout an availability as
a basis for determining actual costs incurred for billing
and estimating purposes. Thus, errors in this rate are in-
cluded in every work item cost estimate and cost calculation.
Any actual condition deviations from the conditions assumed
in developing this rate are reflected in a gain (loss) due
to billing account which is also posted at the end of each
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fiscal year to the retained earnings account. Thus, as
stated earlier, adjustments to this rate can be used to com-
pensate (on future hulls) for excessive profits or losses on
a single hull.
The Ultimate End Cost estimate provided to the Type Com-
mander at the pre-arrival conference is the total initial
sales estimate as of that time plus an allowance based upon
past overhaul history for new work.
The generation of the fixed price offer is primarily an
exercise for the Type Desk Officer in forecasting the remain-
ing materials and mandays necessary to complete the avail-
ability since the costs incurred to that date are known.
Normally, determining the remaining mandays is the most diffi-
cult task. During a recent fixed price determination, the
following sources of data were considered in this calculation:
(1) The planner's revised estimates of remaining material
expenditures. These are also adjusted by an escalation factor
to arrive at the final remaining material estimates
.
(2) The Production Department best shop estimates (col-
lected and prepared by the Work Status Section (Code 376)) of
the production work remaining on each work item. This item
is weighed heavily in the calculation since it includes an
implicit measure of shop performance in meeting the planner's
issued mandays for the work item and can thus be used to flag
either questionable planner estimates (after the fact) or
questionable shop estimates.
(3) The actual total manday expenditures cumulative
through the estimating date fitted with an expenditure factor

which reflects what was done from that point in the overhaul
through completion on previous ships. This method can pro-
vide useful best and worst case estimates
.
(4) The planner-issued mandays at the estimating date
adjusted by a factor to account for historical increases in
the amount of mandays issued through the completion of over-
haul. This factor is adjusted by the Type Desk Officer's
best estimate of shop performance in meeting these estimates
to arrive at the estimated remaining production mandays.
(5) The actual total manday expenditures through the
estimating date divided by a percentage factor which accounts
for the percentage of total overhaul remaining after the
estimating date.
Each of these manday estimates (when multiplied by the
stabilized manday rate) is added to the remaining material
estimate and the actual incurred costs (labor, overhead, and
material) as of the estimating date to derive a unique fixed
price estimate. These estimates are used as cross-checks on
each other. Type Officer judgement and an awareness of the
desired fixed price variance resulting from the overhaul
determine the final figure submitted to the Shipyard Commander
for approval.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has developed the basic constraints of
schedule, work package, estimated cost, and manpower required
for a given ship. The significant points in this developmental
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process are summarized in figure 3. A key point to remember
is the fact that the work package, while itself undergoing
iterative revision, is a key input into the determination of
the schedule length, the personnel resource requirements, and
the sales estimate. In turn, "should the final initial pro-
jected sales estimate prove too high for the customer, this
may cause a reduction in the scope of authorized work. Con-
siderable discussions typically take place between the
customer (s) and the shipyard at the Pre-Arrival Conference
(A-9 days) to insure that the proper balance of authorized
work and estimated cost are achieved. Also noteworthy are
the implications of an ill-conceived fixed price offer on
the shipyard's retained earnings balance. Ultimately (through
fixed manday rate adjustments on future hulls), the customer
bears the cost of any overruns in either schedule or cost
because of the requirement that the shipyard "break even" in
the long run in the retained earnings account. Finally, the
reader should recall that, despite the workload forecasting
and personnel resource augmentation techniques discussed, Mare
Island has forecast an average shortage of about 650 mandays
per day for the remainder of CY 1976. This shortage will be
taken as a given factor in the chapters which follow. Simi-
larly, having discussed up to this point the development of
the various constraints on a given ship, the author in the




Accordingly, Chapter VI will assume that the initial
constraints have been developed as stated in this chapter
for each ship in overhaul and discuss possible tradeoffs
among them in a multi-ship environment to optimize schedule
adherence. 'But first, the management tools used to monitor
the production process must be described. This is the
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V. MANAGEMENT TOOLS AND THEIR USAGE
A. PURPOSE
This chapter will describe the management aids in use at
Mare Island by the Repair Officer to facilitate his progress-
ing and expediting of production work. The author discovered,
in researching this topic, that the management tools used vary
considerably from one manager to the next. Thus, this chapter
and Chapter VI (which discusses how the information derived
from these sources is used to optimize schedule adherence for
several overhauling ships simultaneously) represents a "snap-
shot" of a point in time. The author makes no claim that the
aids or uses described will be those used in the future either
at Mare Island or other shipyards and does not wish to imply
that they have been those historically employed in the past.
Rather, these are the tools and techniques used by one Repair
Officer at one shipyard during the last quarter of fiscal
year 19 76. These procedures were developed in late 19 7 2 and
have been practiced and refined since then.
The management aids used by the Repair Officer at Mare
Island are products of four distinct sources: the Shipyard
Management Information System (MIS), the Mare Island Non-
Nuclear Composite, locally generated graphs, forms, and
written reports, and verbal status reports. These primary
sources of information are discussed below.
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B. THE SHIPYARD MIS
The Shipyard MIS is a computerized management informa-
tion system which takes into consideration all aspects of
industrial management: forecasting, planning, scheduling,
production, and evaluation. The system software, designed
around a Honeywell 6060 computer system, was developed under
the direction of Naval Sea Systems Command and is continual-
ly modified to produce report forms of use to a broad spec-
trum of system users. The Shipyard MIS is presently in-
stalled and in use at all Naval shipyards but some latitude
exists at the shipyard operating level as to which MIS re-
ports are used and how they are used. The Shipyard MIS re-
lies on an integrated data base which is organized into four
basic subsystems which in turn group 13 available response
applications by management functional category (see figure 4-).
Within these various response applications some M-OO differ-
ent reports are available. This research concerns itself
only with those MIS reports used by the Repair Officer, how-
ever, and only those will be described below. The reader
interested in a more detailed study of the organization and
outputs of the Shipyard MIS may wish to consult reference 12
,
from which the above general description was derived, or
reference 13, which is the standard users' manual for this
system.
C. THE NON-NUCLEAR COMPOSITE
In addition to the Shipyard MIS, Mare Island has developed
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by ship of all outstanding work in the non-nuclear production
area. This system, described in detail in reference 14, is
known as the Non-Nuclear Composite and is managed by the Ship
Work Control Center (Code 36 5) to provide, on demand, conve-
nient management reports to assess the status of remaining
work on non-nuclear systems. The author learned in conduct-
ing this research that some of the information provided by
the Non-Nuclear Composite duplicates information available
through the Shipyard MIS and that Mare Island was in the pro-
cess of eliminating the duplication in favor of the Standard
MIS outputs. Because the Standard MIS reports do not pres-
ently permit sorting of job order KEY-OPS (a KEY-OP is a dis-
tinct portion of work on a system written into a job order)
by system and applicable KEY EVENT, the author believes that
this single feature will continue to make the Non-Nuclear
Composite reports attractive as a management aid even after
all duplication is eliminated. Because the MIS production
control (PC series) reports are organized around KEY-OPS, the
basic task in eliminating duplication between the two systems
is to establish a one-to-one correspondence between KEY-OPS
and other classifications of work authority documents pres-
ently accounted for by the Non-Nuclear Composite (see below).
The Non-Nuclear Composite is a production-oriented system
which keeps track of the numbers of various types of source
documents outstanding on a given ship. These source documents,
a complete listing of which can be found in reference 14,
are each a source of some kind of shipyard action on the
56

system involved. This action may involve clearing an emer-
gent deficiency, performing an item of known work, conduct-
ing a non-destructive test, clearing a valve lineup to
restore the system to a normal lineup, or many others. Each
source document is assigned to a responsible code for action
and is identified in addition by a unique report number, sys-
tem, Key Event, compartment, deck, and location.
There are ten different sort modes available for the data con-
tained on a given ship [see Ref. 14- ] . Those used by the
Repair Officer will be discussed below. The non-nuclear com-
posite contains a strong inherent managerial accountability
and control device in its requirement for Shop Supervisors
to verify completion of the action called for by a given
source document and to sign the Code 3 65 copy of that document
before the document can be cleared from the computerized sys-
tem reports. This requirement, self-imposed by the shipyard,
serves to increase supervisory involvement, knowledge, and
accountability for work status determination and lends con-
siderable credibility to the Non-nuclear Composite reports.
Through the process of "starring," to be discussed below, the
composite reports also acquire an official status.
D. OTHER SOURCES OE INFORMATION
The two other basic sources of management information for
production control and monitoring—locally generated graphs,
forms, and written reports and verbal reports--will be ex-





E. MANAGEMENT AIDS USED TO MONITOR AND CONTROL PRODUCTION
AT THE REPAIR OFFICER LEVEL
1. MIS Outputs
The only MIS output routinely used by the Repair Offi-
cer is the Daily Force Distribution Ship by Shift Report, PF-
102B (see figure 5). This report contains, for each shop,
shift, and ship availability type listed, total mandays worked,
overtime mandays worked, and mandays forecast for the report
3date. Three availability types codes are commonly used: nu-
clear (NU) , non-nuclear (NN) and refueling (RF).
The key to interpreting this report is listed along
the bottom of each page, of which figure 5 is a sample. Under
the column labeled "Shift" are shift numbers, "1"' being the
day shift, "2" being swing shift, and "3" being graveyard
shift. The entries horizontally opposite the shift number "1"
represent the total mandays expended by all shops (far left
hand column) or specific individual shops on that ship avail-
ability on the day in question. The next two rows, labeled
"WF 1" and "Shop 1" respectively, show the mandays actually
expended in waterfront and shop work for that availability.
These two figures sum to the total listed in the previous
row. The row labeled "OT MD" shows overtime mandays worked.
The "WFT MD" and SHOPT MD" rows list total waterfront and in-
shop mandays. The "TRT MD" row shows mandays expended in
training. "TOT MD" reflects the total mandays expended by
the shop (or all shops) during the given day, a figure
that can be directly compared with the row labeled
Availability type refers to discrete phases within a
given overhaul, typically each with a separate managing or-
ganization answering to the Production Officer.
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"WLF" . The latter row contains the Work Status Section (Code
375) manday forecast for the day based upon the short-range
manday estimate previously discussed and the internally
scheduled overhaul length plus historical ship manning trends
(to be discussed further below). Thus, from this report the
Repair Officer can determine at a glance for a given ship
whether non-nuclear manning, either in-toto or by specific
shop, met, exceeded, or fell short of the projected expendi-
ture rate. He can also determine, if desired, whether non-
nuclear manning efficiency is better than or worse than nuclear
and can assess the need for reallocation of personnel re-
sources either from one ship to another or from nuclear to
non-nuclear availabilities within the same ship. (Mare
Island has a limited number of workers qualified to perform
either nuclear or non-nuclear work.) Personnel reallocations
will be discussed further in Chapter VI.
Included as part of the PF102B report is a summary for
all ships of the total manday expenditures in each category
by shop (not shown) and summary (figure 6) which presents a
total for all ships of the mandays expended in each avail-
ability type. This summary data is also of use in determining
if reallocations of personnel are appropriate.
2 . Non-Nuclear Composite Outputs
The Non-nuclear Composite outputs comprise the heart
of the Mare Island production management system. Because of
the situational nature of their use, however, the author has
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a. PCL 216B Tape
Daily, prior to the start of the working day, the
Repair Officer receives a complete PCL216B computer runoff
for each ship (see figures 7,8, and 9). This runoff, or
"tape," as it is called, presents a summary of outstanding
source documents by category and responsible code (figure 7),
by system, category, and cognizant code (figure 8 ) , by key
event, category, and cognizant code (figure 9), and a gross
summary by compartment (also figure 9). A copy of this same re-
port is presented to each group superintendent daily as well.
The PCL216B format does not lend itself to meaningful analysis
by itself ;other factors, such as the proximity of a key event,
status of a given system, recent source document clearance
trends, and production bottlenecks resulting from overmanning
in a given compartment must be known to assess the totals
listed correctly. With this kind of data (to be discussed
below), the Repair Officer can review this report and deter-
mine potential trouble areas and take the necessary action to
redefine shop priorities to eliminate bottlenecks, direct
more manpower to a given system, or hasten clearance of all
items outstanding for a given key event. The tradeoffs in-
volved in this process are the subject of Chapter VI. The
PCL216B report is thus a good day-to-day monitoring and control
aid which can assist in determining the need for resource
reallocation.
As an example of how the PCL 216B tape might be
used in a hypothetical case, suppose that shop 3 8 (outside
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work in USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN 598). Suppose also that
one engine room system in that ship in which shop 3 8 is still
heavily involved, the air conditioning auxiliary seawater
system (AC/ASW) , is due for strength and tightness testing
in two weeks. By a review of figures 7, 8, and 9, the Repair
Officer observes that shop 38 (shown as '938' in column head-
ings) has 848 composite items outstanding on WASHINGTON, that
24 of these are in the AC/ASW system, and that there are a
total of 1080 items outstanding (for all shops) in the engine
room. Now, if recent composite item clearance trends for
other shops working in the engine room have been satisfactory
and if engine room manning has been heavy, the Repair Officer
might elect to redefine priorities such that physical inter-
ference from other shops is reduced if the shop 38 supervisor
feels that this is the problem. The Repair Officer might
also suggest to the shop 38 supervisory personnel that more
emphasis be placed on the AC/ASW system work. By monitoring
the PCL 216B reports in subsequent days, the Repair Officer
can determine whether his actions have been effective.
b. PCL 217E Tape
As a key event scheduled date becomes very close,
managerial attention shifts from numbers of source documents
outstanding to the specific documents outstanding. Control
is effected through use of the PCL 217E runoff (tape) which
presents, by responsible code, a detailed listing by system,
category, and report number of all documents outstanding for
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copies of this tape are made available to the Repair Officer
and group superintendents on a daily basis. These reports,
together with information available to these parties through
daily reports by their subordinates, form a complete and up-
to-date picture of the remaining items necessary to prepare
for the key event and permit managerial action to be focused
upon these items. The Repair Officer and Group Superinten-
dents meet daily early in the morning with the Production
Officer where status of the items may be discussed, and
necessary actions taken to resolve the remaining items in
the quickest fashion possible. The goal of these meetings,
facilitated by a document like the PCL 217E tape, is to get
all involved activities (codes) moving in the same direction
in a coordinated manner.
As an example of how the 217E tape is read, con-
sider the core load (CD key event. A portion of that sec-
tion of the 217E tape is shown by figure 10. From this fig-
ure, the Repair Officer learns, by shop (in this case, Code
290), the specific items outstanding for that key event. For
example, a portion of the test procedure (TP) for the 300kw
motor generator operational test remains to be completed
(first entry).
As an aside, the convention used for recording
dates in this and subsequent non-nuclear composite reports is
as follows: of the five digit date entry, the first two
digits reflect the month, the second two digits reflect the




c. PCL 217G Tape
For certain minor key events (electrical switch-
board initial lightoff is an example) the work to be com-
pleted resides primarily in a single system. In these cases,
the Repair Officer requires that the ship superintendent
manages preparations for the event using the PCL 217G tape
(figure 11) which provides a detailed listing by system, res-
ponsible code, and category of outstanding items. The Repair
Officer will normally monitor the ship superintendent's
efforts in this regard to insure that proper shop support is
obtained. Progress towards clearance of items on this tape
is normally the subject of verbal or conference type reports
to the Repair Officer (discussed below).
Figure 11 might be used as follows in preparation
for the undocking (UD) key event (although by no means a
"minor" key event in the context discussed above, this event
suffices for purposes of illustration if one assumes this key
event to involve only the salvage air system) . By review of
figure 11 beginning with the next-to-last column, the Repair
Officer/Ship Superintendent learns that five items in the
salvage air (ASS) system remain to be cleared for this key
event. Knowing that this key event is scheduled to occur on
a given date (available from the system network drawing) the
Repair Officer/ ship superintendent can assess the level of
shop effort and managerial attention which must be expended
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Locally Generated Graphs, Forms, and Written Reports
The use of locally generated graphs and written re-
ports to supplement the computerized control systems discussed
is highly situational in nature. Such "Ad Hoc" techniques
have the advantage, however, of being easily established or
discontinued when their usefulness is gone and in addition
can be easily tailored to the specific requirements of a
unique situation. Those discussed below are typical examples,
a. Plot of Total Composite Items by Key Event
As certain major key events approach (typically
within 3-4- weeks), Code 365 develops time-plots of the total
number of non-nuclear composite items remaining for that key
event for certain critical shops [normally shop 56 (pipefit-
ters), shop 38 (outside machinists), and shop 51 (electri-
cians)] (see figure 12 for an example).
These plots provide the Repair Officer and Ship
Superintendents with the ability to visually assess progress
and determine, based on past and current completion or
clearance trends, whether it is likely that the key event can
be achieved on schedule. If not, appropriate expediting and
resource real-location decisions can be made.
For example, assuming that the reactor plant
criticality key event is scheduled to occur on 31 March and
that only 50 items may remain on the composite at that time,
the Repair Officer, by reviewing figure 12, may sense as early
as the third or fourth of the month that unless composite
























missed. The several peaks and depressions in this graph re-
present composite item clearance "pushes" followed by pre-
criticality inspections which generate additional work items
(days 9, 18, and 24).
b. Test Progress Summaries
As the dock trial and criticality key events ap-
proach, dockside tests on the affected systems must be com-
pleted and the results reviewed in an orderly fashion to al-
low time for necessary rework. For these key events, Code
36 5 prepares a daily summary of test documents outstanding
for the ship by action code (not shown) and a plot of required
test completion rate versus the actual completion rate (figure
13). Such a summary is prepared for tests under the overall
cognizance of Code 290 (Hull, Propulsion, and Auxiliary Sys-
tems Test Group) and Code 190 (Combat Systems Test Group).
The test documents listed on these summaries are those
"starred" by the Chief Test Engineer representing the above
codes for the particular overhaul during his pre-event review
of the source documents listed in the Non-Nuclear Composite.
"Starring" is used to indicate that a given item must be com-
pleted for the key event of concern and is used to update the
initial key event assignment made by Code 365 when the docu-
ment was entered into the Non-Nuclear Composite System. Star-
ring thus takes into consideration special circumstances which
may have arisen which render the initial key event assignment
inappropriate. Once the starring process is completed, the
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tests remaining to be accomplished before the key event can
commence
.
The information contained in the test progress
summaries can be used to assess whether the test document
clearance rate achieved by a given code/shop is sufficient
to support the key event as scheduled. If not, resource re-
allocations may be possible to restore the required clearance
rates. As the reader may surmise, in the case demonstrated
by figure 13, the key event, scheduled for 25 April, was
missed because the actual testing progress lagged the re-
quired rate too greatly to be made up simply by the addition
of additional testing manpower. In cases like this, limited
working space resulting in physical interference aboard the
submarine often precludes the Repair Officer from taking
what appears to be the obvious course of action.
c. Ship Superintendent Ad Hoc Management Aids
Depending upon the phase of the overhaul, the
Repair Officer requires the ship superintendent to develop
their own means of keeping track of general progress. Typical
examples include lists of equipment removed (ripped-out) from
the ship, completed weld joint listings, lists of equipment
such as pumps , motors , and valves in the various shops by
priority for completion, or, since the scope of certain re-
pairs are not known until the component is inspected, lists
of critical inspection reports, both required and completed.
Although the Repair Officer may personally view these lists,












attention of ship superintendents and shop supervisory per-
sonnel on specific items to be completed. By its signature
verification feature, it also gives the Repair Officer
assurance that items signed off (on the official copy) have
actually been completed and that readiness for the event is
complete.
e. Marked-up System Schematics
As the Engine Room steaming key event approaches,
several control problems confront the Repair Officer. Typi-
cally, the lube oil systems prove controlling for this event
since they must be fully operational including flushing and
hydrostatic testing. Because these systems and others, such
as condensate, may be worked under a single work permit,
monitoring progress using the non-nuclear composite would not
yield sufficient information on the day-to-day status changes
since nothing would be reflected in the composite reports
until all work was completed. In cases such as this, the
Repair Officer makes use of marked-up system schematics main-
tained by Code 3 65 which show portions of the systems not in-
tact, portions under test, portions flushed, and portions
hydroed. These marked-up schematics (based upon information
provided Code 36 5 by the Production Shops) enable the Repair
Officer to assess the rate of progress on critical lube oil,
condensate, and other systems as the overhaul progresses.
f. Weekly Manning Projection vs.
Actual Expenditure Report
Complementing the information presented in the
Daily Force Distribution Report (PF-102B) discussed earlier
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is the Weekly Manning Projection versus Actual Expenditures
Report (figure 14). Prepared and distributed weekly by the
Work Status Section (Code 376), this report presents manning
data by shop (left hand margin) by ship, comparing the fore-
cast amount of mandays against what was actually expended in
both the nuclear and non-nuclear areas. A net variance for
each ship is shown at the bottom of the page and a net
variance by shop at the extreme right hand column (not shown).
Knowing the priorities of the various ships, the Repair Offi-
cer looks for positive variances (overmanning) on low priority
units and negative variances (undermanning) on high priority
units. The combination of these two circumstances may indi-
cate a need for personnel reallocation unless some reason
(physical interference, for example) is known for the apparent
misdistribution. Similarly, by interpreting the shop
variances, the Repair Officer can spot bottlenecks and excess
capacity and may be able to reschedule work to take advantage
of this knowledge.
As an example, by looking at figure 1M-, the Repair
Officer, knowing that WASHINGTON is a high priority ship and
that SAILFISH (SS 572) is low priority (priorities assumed
for purposes of illustration) may note that the latter is 108
mandays overmanned whereas WASHINGTON is undermanned by 236
mandays for the week. Further inspection reveals that shop
11 (shipfitters) was considerably undermanned on WASHINGTON
yet overmanned on SAILFISH. This type of item would prompt





g. Manpower Loading Charts
Prepared approximately quarterly by the Work
Status Section (Code 376), the Manpower Loading Chart pro-
vides a visual summary of the information contained in the
Daily Force Distribution Report (PF 102B) and Weekly Manning
Projection versus Expenditure Reports (see figures 15 and
16). Four different presentations are prepared, one for
each of the availability types (nuclear, non-nuclear, refuel-
ing) and one for the total ship. Within each presentation
type, data is presented for all shops (figure 15) and for in-
dividual shops (figure 16). The information presented is
the Code 376 forecasted manday expenditure profile for the
availability (dotted line) and the actual manday expenditure
profile to date. Key event flags are presented across the
top of the graph for easy reference with official reschedul-
ings indicated by arrows from the flag. The forecasted pro-
file is normally developed when the work package is firmed
and the short-range manday estimates previously discussed
are developed. The forecasted profile thus represents, based
upon historical manning profiles for similar availabilities
and inputs from the production shops, the shipyard's best
estimate of how the total short-range manday estimate must
be distributed to achieve the shipyard's internal schedule
for the overhaul. The reader will recall that the short-
range manday estimate includes an allowance for growth with-
in scope and an allowance for previous shop performance in
meeting the planner's manday estimate.
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The author examined several of these manpower
loading charts in the course of the research and quickly
came to appreciate the power of this display as a tool for
forecasting problems in an availability. It was apparent,
after reviewing these past charts, that significant depar-
tures from the forecasted profile early in the availability,
due either to lack of shop personnel, priority conflicts, or
whatever, were almost impossible to makeup in time to meet
the original schedule. Physical interference in the con-
fined submarine quarters plays a significant role here.
Thus, undermanning early in the availability, particularly
prior to undocking , usually presages slips in all downstream
key events. Further, delaying undocking on one ship can
adversely affect the overhaul of the follow-on vessel due
to limited drydock space. Thus, the Repair Officer is very
concerned with these manning profiles and endeavors , within
the limitations of workers available, allowable overtime,
and subcontracting to keep the manning as close to the fore-
cast as possible. The complexity of this task is overwhelm-
ing, however, when the interacting demands seven or eight
ships simultaneously on the available manpower pool are con-
sidered. In the most critical trades, shops 38, 51, and 56,
a slippage of a major key event, such as undocking on one
ship, immediately perturbs the manning expenditures on all
other ships. The balance is extremely tenuous.
As an example of how figures 15 and 16 might be
read, consider figure 15. It is apparent that from the point
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of ship arrival and drydocking (first "flag" at top of chart),
total shop manning fell considerably behind the projected
requirements, probably due to conditions on other ships (a
similar conclusion emerges from figure 16 for shop 3 8 manning)
As a result, when manning did become available for this ship
(early November) a big manning "push" resulted. As stated
above, however, manning lost early is difficult to make up.
As a result, the undocking (UD) key event is shown to have
slipped three months, with other key events also slipping.
Present in this case, and in many others the author examined,
was the close correlation of the total area under the actual
manning profile to the area under the forecast manning pro-
file through the undocking point. This attests to the accu-
racy of workload (and thus manpower) forecasting for this
overhaul segment.
h. Work Permit Plots
Because work permits (also known as "Ripouts" or
"Re-entries") constitute the basic record used to document
and control non-nuclear work on submarine systems, their
generation, distribution to cognizant -shops , and clearance
basically constitute the other side of the manning picture
in that rates of progress in these areas reflect work actual -
ly done . Accordingly, Code 3 65 maintains plots of these
three progress measures versus time for each ship starting
several months prior to arrival (figure 17). The Repair
Officer's interest in these plots focuses prior to the ship's





generation is rapid enough to fully support all work required
at the arrival date. He also monitors to insure that a large
gap does not develop between work permits written and issued
to the shops and finally to insure that plateaus or decreas-
ing slopes do not develop in the rate of clearance. Any of
these conditions indicate to the Repair Officer that despite
manning levels, work progress is not adequate and further in-
vestigation is required.
As an example, in figure 17 it is apparent that
shortly after ship arrival a large gap did remain between
work permits written and those issued to the cognizant ships.
Further, although not apparent from this figure, by experience
the Repair Officer observes early that the work permit clear-
ance rate is insufficient to meet the original undocking
date of 11 January 197 5.
i. Schedules
The Repair Officer has available listings of the
internal schedule key event dates for use in the production
management process. These listings take the place of the
bulky PERT networks for ease in reference. The Repair Officer
has access, however, to the detailed networks by system
described in Chapter IV if he needs them.
In addition to the detailed networks prepared
for the job scoping conference and referred to above, a 21
Day Schedule (network) is prepared by Code 377 (Scheduling
Section) for the three weeks commencing upon ship arrival.
This schedule reflects the shipyard's detailed plan for the
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first three weeks of the availability, during which time the
ship is docked and major ripout of equipment and hookup of
temporary services commences. It is used by the Repair Offi-
cer as a standard of overall performance monitoring early in
the availability. Such detailed shift-by-shift management of
this early overhaul activity insures that bottlenecks and
supervisory problems which, if left uncorrected, could
jeopardize the entire schedule are identified and corrected
at the earliest possible time. It also insures that the
very busy first three weeks proceed with a maximum of coordi-
nation.
4. Verbal Reports and Feedback Devices
a. Briefings by Ship Superintendents
Early each morning, except on weekends, the Re-
pair Officer is briefed by each ship superintendent on emer-
gent bottlenecks and general work progress since the previous
briefings. This briefing enables the Repair Officer, at his
morning meeting with the Production Officer and group super-
intendents, to bring up the trouble areas for resolution.
These morning briefings are supplemented by further reports
as necessary during the working day and after hours to keep
the Repair Officer fully advised of problem areas causing
work stoppage or slowdown. Elimination of such bottlenecks
is an important facet of the production management process
and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter VI.
b. Weekly Work Progress Conference
Weekly throughout the overhaul the Repair Officer
holds work progress meetings with the Ship Superintendent
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and leading shop personnel to discuss the status of work ac-
complishment. Just as the production management aids used
vary with the phase of the overhaul, so do the content of
these conferences. The basic purpose for such a meeting re-
mains constant, however, and that is to discuss job status
in the presence of those responsible and to gain commitments,
where appropriate, for the completion of lagging work. The
Repair Officer stated "...if a supervisor has not done his
job he will be a little uncomfortable in these meetings..."
Imbuing a feeling of responsibility for work progress in key
supervisors is thus an important purpose of these confer-
ences .
A typical conference agenda includes a review of
the Non-Nuclear Composite gross numbers by shop for the next
key event, a review of testing status, and a review of coming
minor events in the production sequence. Special problems
which the shops are having are identified and planned correc-
tive action is sought from the responsible supervisors.
As a major key event approaches or as a major
job gets behind schedule, these meetings become more detailed
in scope and more than one such meeting per week may be held.
During such meetings, the Repair Officer requires the ship
superintendent to prepare and present a detailed short-range
schedule, typically of the GANTT type, showing the comple-
tion-of-work sequence. This document is then used to gain
commitments from the supervisors regarding completion of the
scheduled steps. Such a short-range schedule, in addition
to providing accountability, also serves to get all
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supervisors moving in the same direction and provides an ex-
cellent document for supervisor and ship superintendent shift
turnover.
Also, in preparation for upcoming key events, the
PCL 217E detailed listing of outstanding composite items pre-
viously discussed becomes part of the meeting agenda. Again
the emphasis is on gaining commitments from supervisors and
identifying problem areas for early resolution.
Because of the significance of the undocking
event, the Repair Officer also uses a special agenda for
meetings preceding that event. This undocking agenda is
basically a tickler listing of items which have controlled
undocking in the past to make sure they are being properly
pursued. Thus, the Repair Officer may seek details on tank
closure status, rudder and stern plane progress, and other
items not specifically addressed elsewhere in a readiness-
for-undocking context.
c. Weekly Meeting with the Ship Commanding Officer
Weekly, after the work progress conference, the
Repair Officer meets with the Commanding Officers of the
overhauling ships to present to them the status of the over-
haul. While the information presented to the Commanding
Officer is largely based upon data accumulated in the work
progress conference, the Repair Officer receives from the
Commanding Officer his comments regarding the overhaul—
a
sometimes valuable input since the Commanding Officer can
point out problems the ship's company may be having either
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with their own work (upon which the completion of some ship-
yard work may depend) or in supporting shipyard work. In
addition the Commanding Officer may point out areas of un-
satisfactory work or work progress which require further
evaluation and action by the shipyard.
F. SUMMARY OF PRODUCTION MONITORING AIDS
The reader by this point undoubtedly has an appreciation
not only for the variety of management tools available to
the Repair Officer, but also for the varieties of circum-
stances under which different tools are used. Figure 18
presents a brief summary of this chapter by classifying the
various management aids as to their usage, either as (1)
routine production monitoring devices or (2) special aids
used to insure total readiness for a key event or (3) aids
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VI. SEEKING SCHEDULE ADHERENCE
THE TRADEOFF PROBLEM
A. PURPOSE
In reality, the Repair Officer's problem is:
GIVEN SCHEDULE, WORKLOAD, AVAILABLE MANPOWER, AND COST
CONSTRAINTS, HOW CAN SCHEDULE ADHERENCE BE ACHIEVED
SIMULTANEOUSLY ON SEVERAL SHIPS IN 'AN OVERHAUL ENVIRONMENT?
As the title implies, this process is rarely executed with-
out some tradeoffs and, in practice, seeking schedule adher-
ence on one ship may, at least in the short run, cause a
schedule departure on one or more other ships. Similarly,
even if a schedule-maintaining course of action can be taken
on one ship without affecting others, such a course of
action may be costly. The author does not attempt to examine
the full realm of schedule adherence problems typically en-
countered in management of a nuclear submarine overhaul in
this chapter; such a task could fill many volumes and still
leave the reader unsatisfied. This is because each such
problem is slightly different and a fine degree of managerial
judgement is required. This chapter will thus seek to define
the techniques employed at Mare Island to achieve schedule
adherence, to examine the considerations involved, and
finally to suggest to the reader the true complexity of the
schedule adherence problem.

B. BASIC PROCESS PARAMETERS
As Chapter IV explained, there are four basic parameters
involved in the production management or schedule adherence
process on a single ship: schedule, available workforce,
authorized workload, and estimated cost. The author assumes
in this chapter that initial values for each of these para-
meters have been developed as described in Chapter IV for
each of several overhauling vessels. As was stated earlier,
since workforce augmentations are not possible in the short
run, the shipyard labor base is assumed fixed throughout this
chapter. The reader will recall that this workforce is cur-
rently, insufficient to meet the projected workload without
the use of overtime and subcontracting. These points will
be amplified upon below. Further, because the day-to-day
decisions involved in the production management process are
primarily geared to .achieve schedule adherence, an analysis
of the cost impact of the various courses of action considered
will be discussed as consequence of those courses of action
rather than as a variable which is consciously manipulated.
The reader 'should thus realize at the start that in the dis-
cussions which follow the goal of these courses of action is
to accomplish the authorized workload within the internally
scheduled dates using the available manpower resources.
C. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Cost-Schedule Relationships
The reason the author elected to treat costs as a
consequence of day-to-day production management decisions
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rather than as a driving consideration in their formulation
is the Mare Island philosophy that, in striving to achieve
the schedule, a near-optimum degree of control over customer-
borne real and opportunity costs is simultaneously achieved.
The components of this philosophy are threefold.
First, meeting (or bettering) the scheduled overhaul
length generally means that an adequate level of skill exists
in the shipyard shops so that time (and cost) consuming re-
. . . 4
work is minimized. Further, if, as in the case of Mare Island,
a low skilled-to-unskilled worker ratio exists , achieving
schedule adherence implies that supervision leading to the
rapid identification and correction of deficient work has
been intense, thus minimizing the effects of the low skill
level condition. In this case, while the material and labor
cost increase of the rework cannot be averted, some of the
unplanned costs duetto schedule slippage are (see below).
Secondly, the customer receives specific cost benefits
from on-time or early ship completion. These benefits result
not only from the opportunity costs saved when the submarine
is returned to service but also in the use of lower stabilized
manday rates on future hulls because the ship was not consum-
ing resources beyond her projected overhaul -duration. (The
The magnitude of the rework problem varies considerably
depending on the type of work involved. As might be suspected,
welding, where defects are usually not known until after non-
destructive tests (such as x-ray inspection) are completed,
the rework rate is quite high, perhaps 2 to 3 percent. On
valves, where the work involved normally includes a complete
overhaul to stop leakage both into the ship and past the seat,
rework rates due to all causes are about ten percent. For
larger jobs, such as pump and motor overhauls, the rework rate
is generally lower, perhaps 2 to 3 percent.
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reader will recall that the shipyard must price work so as
to break even in the long run.) The unfavorable fixed price
variance resulting from a ship whose schedule is not met is
thus ultimately borne by the customer through price increases
on subsequent vessels. The customer further benefits from
early or on-schedule ship completion by the avoidance of
bottlenecks on other ships in overhaul due to unplanned re-
source expenditures on the ship in question. The cost of
these bottlenecks, as they affect schedule adherence on these
other vessels, are ultimately borne by the customer as de-
scribed above. By eliminating such bottlenecks, the overall
productive efficiency of the shipyard is enhanced and future
costs to the customer can be reduced.
Finally, meeting or bettering the scheduled overhaul
completion date, particularly in the case of Mare Island
where the inherent labor base is below the projected require-
ments, implies that managerial employment of the various
hedges discussed below against this disadvantage has been
effective. These hedges each contain cost-saving features
when properly employed.
The author notes one unstated yet basic assumption
in this philosophy: pursuit of the schedule must be efficient
This means, for example, that any inefficiency in performance
(such as funding several alternative and parallel courses of
action to solve a production problem) however well-intended,
will cause a departure from the "minimum cost" concept. In
this instance, the author intends "courses of action" to .iean
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different approaches to accomplishing a given task rather
than tasks which would of necessity be done anyway. Thus,
once one of these courses of action is successful, any money
or time spent in pursuit of the others is lost.
2. Determination of Project and Job Priorities
Inherent in the discussion which follows is an as-
sumed knowledge by the Repair Officer of project (ship) and
job priorities. Although the guidance of reference 10 gives
SSBN type ships precedence in an even tradeoff situation,
the problem is rarely that simple. Even though a given ship
may have overall priority because of the nearness of a major
key event, some jobs on lower priority ships may be just as
important or more important than some work on that ship.
To help clarify the question of priorities , the morn-
ing meeting of the Repair Officer, Production Officer, and
group superintendents is attended by the Shipyard Commander.
At this meeting, problem areas and bottlenecks are discussed
and, if necessary and with the approval of the Shipyard Com-
mander, priorities are assigned. Generally, ship priorities
are not specifically discussed but follow a general rule:
the closest ship to completion has the highest priority with
nuclear ships ranking above non-nuclear. Job priorities,
where not discussed at the morning meeting, are determined
by the Repair Officer and group superintendents by experience
and their knowlege of the pending key events on the various
ships. Thus, even though no problems are being encountered,
completion of a hydrostatic test of a system on ship X (sixth
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in ship priority) to support operational testing of the sys-
tem scheduled for the following day is pursued as an important
job.
Priority guidance resulting from the morning meeting
with the Production Officer and Shipyard Commander is carried
to the shop heads by the group superintendents in a separate
meeting which immediately follows. Similarly, shifts in
priority are conveyed to ship superintendents by the Repair
Officer.
Since shift turnovers to the evening and graveyard
shift are a possible source of communications breakdowns re-
garding jobs to be worked, the Repair Officer, assisted in
the drafting and preparation by the ship superintendents and
shop heads, issues a daily teletype to all trades advising
them of the priority work by ship to be pursued during the
2 4-hour period commencing with the evening (swing) shift.
Trade responsibility and points of contact for notification
of impediments to progress on the listed jobs are also
assigned in this teletype message.
3 . Manning Limits and Constraints
Chapter V introduced some of the complexities involved
in the determination of ship manning. Central to any decision
to manipulate the manning on a given ship in a given area are
two primary considerations.
The first effect to be considered is the number of
people already working in the area. Even though a job may be
seriously behind schedule, work may be proceeding on the job
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(or on other jobs in the vicinity) such that the area is
physically saturated with workers adding more workers might
even be counterproductive in such an instance. The shipyard
has conducted loading studies which give rough bounds on the
limits of men for the various critical work areas. This
factor can play an important part in determining the appro-
priate course of action.
The second factor which must be considered is the
impact of the contemplated adjustment on other vessels.
Scheduled key event date slips to accommodate a single trade
in trouble, for example, can have a snowballing effect by
providing slack to other critical trades, causing the latter
to remain on the ship working when they should have been
completed and moving to the next ship. Similarly, pulling
too many workers from a job on a ship where some slack
exists may eventually cause that job to fall into the critical
path to overhaul completion.
Because these two effects are complicated many fold
by a multi-ship environment, the Repair Officer does not per-
sonally decide upon day-to-day numbers of the various trade-
workers assigned to "the non-nuclear production task. Rather,
he provides guidance to the shop heads as to jobs which de-
serve more or less attention and relies upon the shop head
to efficiently assign his men. The Repair Officer then uses
the various tools described in Chapter V to monitor the
results
,
for example, an increasing rate in the clearance of
composite items. If the results are still inadequate, the
Repair Officer again speaks to the shop head.
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By employing this method of dealing with the manning
problem, the Repair Officer avoids becoming a bottleneck him-
self and builds a strong sense of responsibility into the
shop heads for their actions. It also places this critical
decision-making responsibility at the level most aware of the
long-term implications involved in carrying it out.
4. Bottleneck Resolution
Occasionally, despite the assignment of job and ship
priorities, a shop head is confronted with a situation calling
for more resources than he has. Typical are simultaneous man-
ning requirements for multiple priority jobs on several differ-
ent ships, both nuclear and non-nuclear requirements for the
same piece of equipment, and others. These situations, until
resolved, become a bottleneck slowing or stopping progress on
critical work. When such bottlenecks cannot be resolved by
the ship superintendents involved (usually by one yielding to
the other), the Repair Officer is called in to provide guidance
Again, without telling the shop head how to distribute
his resources, the Repair Officer provides the necessary clari-
fication of priorities and advises the ship superintendents of
the guidance provided. In the case of a nuclear/non-nuclear
issue, the Repair Officer and Nuclear Repair Officer jointly
reach a compromise. In very unusual circumstances, the Pro-
duction Officer or even the Shipyard Commander may be called
into the resolution process.
5
It is not unusual for a shop to be actively pursuing
a hundred jobs a day on a single ship.
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D. SCHEDULE ADHERENCE OPTIONS
Each of the techniques to be discussed below represents
a choice available in the multi-ship schedule adherence pro-
cess. Because schedule adherence problems reside in the fact
that the authorized work is not being done rapidly enough,
three of these techniques are also used routinely as a hedge
against the inadequate labor force discussed previously.
1. The Use of Overtime
Proper use of overtime can have a very positive effect
on the schedule adherence of a vessel. On the other hand,
fully understanding the mechanics, economics, and considera-
tions involved in overtime management is an elusive task.
For example, the reader may feel, as the author mistakenly
did early in the research, that given the use of overtime,
schedule adherence is always possible if one is willing to
accept the added costs. This impression is incorrect.
First, as stated in earlier chapters, NAVSEA has im-
posed a limit on the use of overtime on all naval shipyards.
For Mare Island, this limit is an average of six percent of
the total labor force per quarter. Depending on the labor
force on board, this limit translates to about 3000 to 3200
mandays per week of overtime available. However, this amount
is the combined total for nuclear repairs, non-nuclear re-
pairs including supply, public works, and indirect labor.
During any given week, as little as 110 mandays may actually
be available to augment the regular direct shift work in the
non-nuclear area. This amount, even when supplemented by a
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small amount of nuclear repair overtime, is insufficient to
offset the average projected labor shortage of about 6 50 man-
days per day [Ref
. 3] . Other techniques must be used to
close this gap (see below).
Similarly, the economics of overtime usage are not
what they at first appear to be. In fact, for several rea-
sons, overtime usage is a cost-saving technique to the custo-
mer despite the fact that overtime wages are 5 percent
greater. The anomaly may be understood if the reader con-
siders the basic relationship between mandays required for
a job and time to complete the job. In the absence of work
area saturation effects (which overtime can help to reduce),
doubling the manpower halves the time or, alternatively, not
using continuous manning by holding back on overtime extends
the time. Looking at a total ship, it then follows that
continuing manning on critical path jobs through the weekends
(overtime) should reduce the overhaul schedule length. The
implied economics to the customer of shorter duration over-
hauls discussed earlier pertain here as well.
There is another more subtle economy to be realized
in overtime usage, however. The customer is charged the same
stabilized manday rate throughout the overhaul, regardless
of whether the manday is overtime or not. However, offsetting
the larger than normal portion of this manday charge consumed
by the higher worker wage rate are smaller charges during
overtime periods for indirect or supervisory workers. This
is because fewer supervisors and other indirect workers are
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onboard during overtime periods. Thus, the declining indirect




Finally, because certain major items of physical equip-
ment, such as cranes, are used during overtime periods, these
assets are not idle expenses during such times, absorbing a
portion of the overhead costs but producing nothing. This
factor, too, serves to favor the use of overtime.
The reader may wonder why an overtime limitation is
imposed at all. The author believes there are two primary
reasons. The first is the tendency for overtime to be abused
by shop personnel if not carefully controlled. The second is
a full-employment consideration. With national unemployment
in excess of seven percent, reducing authorized overtime tends
to force fuller employment than would be the case if unre-
stricted overtime were permitted.
The six percent per quarter limit on the use of over-
time is of some help in easing the existing deficits in the
available work force. However, until late 19 7 6 when the pro-
jected deficit drops to about 400 mandays per day, the over-
time limit alone is still insufficient to bridge the gap.
Further, the necessity to use overtime labor for this purpose
tends to reduce the flexibility which would otherwise exist
in applying overtime to critical path work. In practice, the
°While the total number of supervisors declines during
overtime periods, the decline in numbers of direct workers is
even greater so that the supervisor to laborer ratio actually
becomes more favorable during these periods. This remains
true even through the overall ratio of indirect labor (which
includes a large number of non-supervisory personnel) to
direct labor declines, as stated.
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most urgent jobs in relation to pending key events are manned
through the weekends while other important critical path work
simply is not in some instances. The negative influence of a
deficient workforce can, of course, be offset by other means
(see below). To the extent that these are successful,
managerial flexibility in applying overtime to strictly
critical path work is restored.
The overtime allocation and approval process in the
non-nuclear production area is conducted on a weekly basis.
Each other overtime user (public works, nuclear repair, and
production indirect labor) prepares and submits overtime man-
day requirements for the coming weekend (Saturday day shift
through Sunday graveyard shift) and the following working
week to the Repair Officer who absorbs the remainder so as
to bring the weekly shipyard total within the six percent
limit. In practice, he may submit a total requirement figure
slightly in excess of the six percent limit in anticipation
of a small number of "no show" workers.
The shop heads and ship superintendents advise the
Repair Officer each Thursday of work items by ship for which
overtime authorization is requested in order of priority. The
Repair Officer then assesses the available amount of non-
nuclear overtime, the requested list of work items, the pro-
ject and job priorities, and the general trade postures on the
ships in question and allocates overtime up to the allowed
limit. In this process, the Repair Officer may determine that
a legitimate need exists in the non-nuclear area for additional
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overtime for the week in question. Unless the amount is small,
some other user's requirements must be reduced in such a case.
This situation is resolved when the entire overtime require-
ments package is subsequently reviewed by the Production Offi-
cer and finally reviewed and approved by the Shipyard Commander,
The detailed preparation, review, and approval process
described above provides a fine degree of control over over-
time usage. Subsequent modifications to the approved package
in the non-nuclear area, due to oversight or unexpected
changes in work status, are personally approved by the Repair
Officer.
To give the reader an appreciation for the approximate
size of the overtime work force on a given' ship , a typical
non-nuclear weekly overtime allocation of 12 mandays will
be examined. Since this is normally expended primarily on
the six weekend shifts, there are about 20 mandays per shift
available. With ten ships in the yard undergoing various
types of work, this means, on the average, 2 men per shift
per ship. While in practice, some ships receive more than
this average figure and others less depending on priorities,
the numbers involved are nevertheless small in comparison
with the normal direct labor application per shift during . the
work week, which is in excess of 3 00 men on the average.
2 . The Use of Subcontracting
Subcontracting work to private concerns represents
another important technique useful in offsetting the effects




NAVSEA, in reference 15
,
prescribes limits on the sub-
contracting of shipboard work. Specific NAVSEA (07) permis-
sion is required, for example, prior to permitting contractor
personnel aboard the submarine. However, no restrictions are
placed upon the unshipping of components for work at a con-
tractor's plant. Further, many major shipboard components are
amenable to this treatment and a degree of flexibility lost
in the use of overtime can thus be restored.
Prior to the start of an overhaul, conscious decisions
regarding what components will be subcontracted are made.
The driving consideration in these decisions is the projected
trade requirements and availability for the ship in question
when the effects of interaction with other ships and the size
of the work package are considered. Table 1 shows a listing
of subcontracted work during a recent SSBN overhaul.
Table I. SUBCONTRACTED WORK DURING RECENT SSBN OVERHAUL
Overhaul 3 4 High Pressure Air valves
Rewind 2 3 00 KW motor generator sets
Conduct Miscellaneous sandblasting of hull and
tanks
Install new quills, pinions, and reduction
gear hubs
Overhaul 174 missile air valves
Manufacture reduction gear couplings and sleeves
Overhaul 7 steam distilling plant valves
Overhaul 14 fuel oil and compensating water
valves
Overhaul 7 main ballast tank blow valves
Overhaul 5 6 missile compensating valves
Overhaul 31 plumbing system valves
Overhaul 83 service air valves
Overhaul 254 missile air valves in place
Overhaul 3 8 control air valves
Overhaul 84 potable water valves in place
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In addition to the subcontracting consciously initiated at
the start of an overhaul, it is sometimes necessary to sub-
contract other components after the start of the overhaul if
a particular trade becomes severely short of manpower due to
delays on a previous ship or unexpected work package growth.
In addition to real economies which are often realized
by subcontracting, the shipyard (and thus, the customer)
reaps gains from this technique through improved schedule ad-
herence. The latter effect is predominant in most cases,
but in some sandblasting is a good example the use of
subcontracting enables the. shipyard to avoid the expense of
maintaining large specialized shops to accommodate the rela-
tively infrequent demand for those services.
3. Shifting Assets Between Shops
This technique is a useful one during the ripout phase
of an overhaul when excess capacity exists in the machine
shops until equipment to be worked upon in the shops is re-
moved from the ship. In this instance, the Repair Officer
approves the temporary transfer of a number of Shop 31 (in-
side machinists) to Shop 38 to assist in the ripout phase.
This supplements the usually scarce Shop 38 resources and
enables the similarly scarce Shop 31 personnel (who cannot
begin work until equipment is in the shop) to begin their
repair work sooner.
4. The Use of Borrowed Labor
In unusual circumstances, NAVSEA permits one Naval
Shipyard to draw on the excess personnel resources of another.
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Because this is quite expensive, however, it is normally used
only as a last resort to maintain a schedule in severe jeo-
pardy or, in instances where organized, specialized services
exist at one shipyard and the cost of acquiring the same ser-
vices at Mare Island would exceed the cost of using the for-
mer shipyard's assets. Use of this technique must be
approved by the Shipyard Commander.
5. Changing the Schedule
Although listed under SCHEDULE ADHERENCE OPTIONS, use
of this technique really represents an admission on the part
of management that, for one reason or another, the existing
schedule cannot be met. As discussed earlier, any readjust-
ment of the schedule on one ship can have far-reaching effects
on other ships as the orderly peaking and tapering off of
trade manning is disturbed. It then becomes possible to have
multiple ships approaching the same major key event simul-
taneously, a situation the shipyard labor force cannot ade-
quately support.
To minimize these effects, the Repair Officer's prac-
tice is normally not to reschedule key events not on the
critical path (figure 2), even if they are abused. Often,
because of the "schedule early" philosophy employed (Chapter
IV), minor key events can be missed without affecting the
overall schedule. When it becomes apparent that a critical
path key event will be missed, the Repair Officer communi-
cates this fact through the Production Officer to the Ship-
yard Commander who makes the ultimate decision. If the
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availability completion date is affected by the change, the
customer's concurrence is requested by message. Otherwise,
the change is made and reported to NAVSEA in the next monthly
update of the key event schedule (Chapter IV).
E. THE SCHEDULE ADHERENCE CHALLENGE
The author has sought, in the preceding chapter, to de-
velop for the reader the underpinnings necessary to understand
the challenge of schedule adherence. If he has conveyed
nothing else to the reader in these chapters, the author
hopes that the dynamic nature of the schedule adherence prob-
lem is now apparent. There are no absolutes, no black and
white situations, and few actions that can be taken which
are without side effects somewhere else. As the Repair Offi-
cer stated, "Maintaining schedules is an art not a science.






The author has endeavored in this research to document
an exceedingly complex and elusive managerial process, both
for the purpose of recording the features of this process
for the benefit of future students of the subject and also
to demonstrate the problems confronting shipyard managers
in all shipyards. This chapter briefly reviews the impor-
tant points presented.
B. SHIPYARD DESCRIPTION, ORGANIZATION, AND STRATEGIC PROFILE
Chapter II described the role of Mare Island Naval Ship-
yard in the Naval Shipyard Complex, described its physical
location, and noted that the present work force fell short
of projected work requirements and that the Production Shop
skill level had declined in recent years. In this chapter as
well, the shipyard production organization was discussed, in-
cluding the immediate senior in the chain of command and the
relationship with the customer. The computerized Long Range
Planning System method of ship overhaul assignments was ex-
plained and the resulting planned ship load at Mare Island
was shown and explained. The goal of the Mare Island produc-
tion management process work accomplishment, on schedule,
and at minimum cost (for that schedule) was stated.
109

C. TYPICAL OVERHAUL SEQUENCE
Chapter III introduced the concept of key events and
discussed the use of key events in defining the overhaul
sequence. A typical nuclear submarine overhaul sequence was
displayed and discussed.
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTRAINTS
Chapter IV developed the basic parameters with which any
production management scheme must constantly reckon esti-
mated (or target) cost, available work force, authorized work
package, and approved schedule. The author pointed out that
the authorized overhaul duration and scheduled dates are im-
posed upon naval shipyards by CNO after consideration of such
factors as projected work to be done, refueling requirements,
and strategic considerations. The author also explained that
within the general bounds of this approved duration and time
span the shipyard is - able to sequence and schedule the over-
haul milestones (key events) to suit. It was noted that the
scheduling philosophy in practice at Mare Island at the time
of this research was to schedule individual overhaul activi-
ties to occur at their earliest possible time to enable timely
selection of alternative courses of action if delays were en-
countered in order to permit accomplishing the activity with-
out delaying the overall projection completion date.
Continuing, Chapter IV showed how the authorized work
package for a nuclear submarine overhaul was composed and con-
structed by activities external to the shipyard and how, given
this work package, schedule, work force, and cost estimates
could be developed. The Long Range manday projections made
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by Mare Island based upon the projected and known work on
assigned overhauls is the basis for personnel work force
adjustments undertaken. Similarly, Short Range manday esti-
mates developed by the shipyard as specific work requirements
are clarified, after adjustment for growth and shop perform-
ance, constitute "will-cost" manday estimates which form
the basis of the sales estimating procedure and detailed ship
manning profiles. These estimates enable a projection to be
made of workforce excesses or deficits (as is presently the
case)
.
Finally, Chapter IV noted that Mare Island is a NIF acti-
vity whose accounting goal is to operate, in the long run,
with neither profit nor loss. With this as background, two
types of cost estimates were introduced the final initial
sales estimate (used at the pre-arrival conference to advise
the customer of the projected cost of the authorized work so
that authorized work adjustments may be made, if desired)
and the fixed price estimate. The latter, developed at the
5 percent completion point in the overhaul, is the shipyard's
offer to the customer for a fixed price on the overhaul com-
pletion at that point in time (the shipyard assumes the risk
of overruns but reaps the gains of undercutting this estimate)
Chapter IV further discussed the implications of either low
or high fixed price offers on the ultimate desired "zero
balance" in the shipyard's retained earning account. The
author made the point that acceptance of the fixed price offer
by the customer "seals" the work package against further
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growth. Each new work item from that point onward is sepa-
rately negotiated with the customer as to cost and schedule
impact. The author also noted in Chapter IV that the em-
phasis in the NIF accounting system on neither profit nor
loss serves to place a premium on performing in accordance
with prior estimates rather than performing as well as
possible. While it is not likely that any shipyard inter-
prets the intent as such, this accounting system goal seems
counter to good management practice and provides no clear
incentive for aggressive cost controls.
E. MANAGEMENT TOOLS AND THEIR USAGE
In Chapter V, the author categorized the various aids
available to assist the Repair Officer in the monitoring and
control of the production process on several ships simul-
taneously into four broad groupings: Shipyard MIS products,
Non-nuclear Composite Products, locally generated graphs,
forms, and written reports, and verbal reports and feedback
devices. An explanation of the Non-nuclear composite a
locally developed computerized work progressing system was
given and this system was compared with the standard Ship-
yard MIS. Examples and illustrations of the documents and
inputs actually used in each of the four cited groupings were
given and a visual summary, Figure 18, was presented at the
end of Chapter V.
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F. SEEKING SCHEDULE ADHERENCE THE TRADEOFF PROBLEM
In Chapter VI the author brought together the material
presented in previous chapters and explained, given the
various constraints, the process and philosophy employed at
Mare Island to seek schedule adherence. The author noted
early in this discussion that cost was not a driving consi-
deration for most production management decisions at Mare
Island because of the philosophy practiced there that striv-
ing to achieve the schedule simultaneously achieves a near-
optimum control over costs. The author also noted as impli-
cit in this philosophy the assumption that production is
efficient and without wasted motion or costs. The author
next discussed the assignment of project and job priorities
and the limitations imposed by (1) submarine and (2) multi-
ship environments on orderly manning. The general techniques
of bottleneck identification and resolution were also
presented.
Finally, the author discussed in detail the various op-
tions available to the Repair Officer as he seeks to maintain
schedules on several ships simultaneously: use of overtime,
the use of subcontracting, inter-shop personnel transfers,
use of borrowed labor, and changing the schedule. Significant
among these are the use of overtime, which, although restricted
by NAVSEA, provides efficiencies and cost savings in the long
run. Similarly, subcontracting, properly applied, can yield
economies. Further, both of these techniques, which are
widely used at Mare Island, tend to offset the aforementioned
labor shortage and bring true schedule adherence within grasp.
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VIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT
"The ultimate measure of our effectiveness is in the
delivery of our ships on time at a competitive cost."
[7].
In this statement, Mare Island proposes an intuitively appeal-
ing means of assessing effectiveness.
The author decided early in the research to refrain from
any attempt to render value judgements on the process docu-
mented in the research in order to maintain an objective per-
spective in recording that process. Had such an evaluation
been undertaken, however, using the above criterion, or any
other which might at first glance seem appropriate, insur-
mountable difficulties would have been encountered. The
problem in attempting to assess shipyard performance in quan-
tifiable terms is the fact that every overhaul is different,
and the ever-present variables of ship type, ship age, ship
operating schedule, material availability, governing direc-
tives and work standards, labor force size and skill level,
inflation trends, and general managerial priorities operate'
so as to really obfuscate comparisons. One might think, for
instance, that schedule adherence is black and white—either
the allowed date is met or it is not. In the case of a
schedule extension due to a manpower shortage on one ship
caused by emergent work on the preceding ship, how does one
assess liability in such an instance? Similarly, attempts to
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analyze shipyard final cost data as compared to fixed price
(the difference being the net change in the shipyard's re-
tained earnings account) can be exceedingly difficult. What
does it mean, for instance, when on five ships in a row cost
overruns are incurred? It could mean, obviously, that either
schedule control or cost controls were poor (or both). It
could also mean, however, that some factor was operating so
as to render the price estimates consistently under the true
figures. This, in turn, could be traced to any one of the
component factors involved in a cost estimate mandays , re-
serve factors, performance factors, material factors, etc.
The author was overwhelmed by the apparent difficulty of
this problem and yet considers that some valid comparative
measure would be of assistance not only to management of the
shipyard in properly defining the problem area in question-
able situations such as discussed above but also to NAVSEA
and CNO in determining schedule durations and ship assignments
Development of such a measure is suggested as a subject
for further research.
B. NIF ACCOUNTING EMPHASIS
The author remains concerned that the NIF accounting sys-
tem together with the (desired) fixed pricing arrangement
seems to offer no clear incentive to control costs other than
to meet the fixed price estimate.
Investigation of this facet of the NIF accounting system
to determine whether such an incentive is feasible is sug-
gested as a topic for further research.
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C. SHIPYARD MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
The author, in completing this report, became impressed
with the range of management aids and techniques used by the
Repair Officer at Mare Island. Particularly innovative, it
appeared to the author, were the use of manpower loading
charts, the Non-nuclear Composite, and the Repair Officer's
practice, in the area of ship manning, to provide shop heads
general priority guidance and then to monitor the results of
the implementation of that guidance by other means.
It occurred to the author, then, that other shipyards
surely have similarly innovative techniques, perhaps in dif-
ferent areas. A compilation of such techniques would, it
seems to the author, be an invaluable aid not only to
students of the production management process, but also to
those involved in its day-to-day operation.
Documentation of such techniques at other naval and
private shipyards by techniques such as was employed in this
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